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INTRODUCTION 
T h i s i s fhp R e p l y Br ief f r on Jame*"« M "I I'mlL i (he r^ i iiini f l 
"Waii'iHi mi leienaajii j L i.n in i e i ot Respondent "Lie y ui 
Richfield (hereinafter "Richfield" or plaintiff). 
ARGUM E MT 
I. DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED OF BEING IN ACTUAL 
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE AS DEFENDANT WAS A PASSIVE 
OCCUPANT, MERELY USING HIS VEHICLE AS A PLACE TO SLEEP, 
actual physical control of a veh icle wh i ] e i inder the inf] i lence of 
i n significant respects from the case at bar 
In Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court found that there was 
actual physical control when the defendant was positioned In the 
driverfs seat behind the steering wheel with possession of the 
ignition key. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 
1982) . Although defendant in Garcia was unable to move his car 
because of its position between a fence and a parked car, 
defendant was in the driver fs seat and had exclusive control of 
the ignition key. £d. 
In Lopez, the defendant was again seated in the driver's 
seat, with his head resting on the steering wheel and the keys in 
the ignition. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 773, 779 (Utah 
1986) . The arresting officer had to turn the keys in order to 
remove them from the ignition. Lopez. 720 P. 2d at 779. The 
Utah Supreme Court noted that "[positioning in the driver's seat 
is an element common to all of the cases that have found actual 
physical control of a motionless vehicle.11 Lopez, 720 P.2d at 
780. The court went on to say that in negating a claim of actual 
physical control, the focus is on the status of the occupant, not 
that of the vehicle* Id. 
In both Lope2 and Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its definition of actual physical control as being "present 
bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." 
State v. Bugger. 483 P.2d 442f 443 (Utah 1971). The Lopez court 
expressly negated a comparison by the Lopez defendant to that of 
the defendant in Bugger, stating that "Nothing in that case 
[Bugger] indicates that the driver was in the driver's seat at 
2 
the time he was found and arrested." Lopez. 720 P.2d at 780. 
However, the defendants position in this case was analogous 
to that of the defendant in Bugger. In both this case and 
Bugger, the defendants were asleep in their cars, lying down on 
the seat, their vehicles removed from the traveled portion of the 
highway, and the motors were not running. As nothing in Bugger 
indicated that the defendant was in the driver's seat at the time 
he was arrested, the same is true in this case. Therefore, as in 
Bugger, the defendant in this case is not guilty of being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol. 
It is recognized that acts short of starting a vehicle can 
be held to constitute actual physical control, but it w. . . 
requires that a person be in the driver's seat of .a vehicle, 
behind the steering wheel, in possession of the ignition key, and 
in such a condition that he is physically capable of starting the 
engine and causing the vehicle to move." Garcia, 645 P.2d at 
645, citing 351 N.E.2d 85 at 87 (emphasis added). Here, the 
defendant was not in such a condition that he was physically 
capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move. 
II. DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER RICHFIELD CITY 
ORDINANCE 1983-2 BECAUSE IT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM UTAH 
STATUTORY LAW AND THUS IS INVALID. 
The trial court was correct in holding that the Richfield 
City ordinance was consistent with state law at the time it was 
adopted. R. Memorandum Decision 87-TF-1140 at 5. The trial 
court also ruled correctly that the ordinance did not adopt in 
3 
1976. by reference, the entire Utah Traff ic Code, including a l l 
subsequent amendments. Id. 
However, the t r i a l court did not properly rule on the e f f e c t 
of Richf ie ld 1 s f a i lure t o adopt those subsequent amendments, as 
Richf ie ld was allowed t o prosecute under t h e ordinance in 
question. 
An ordinance adopted by a local authority 
that governs a person's operating or being in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having alcohol in the blood or while 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug, or that governs, in relation to any of 
those matters, use of a chemical test or 
chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, 
or penalties, or that governs any combination 
of those matters, shall be consistent with 
the provisions in this code which govern 
those matters. 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-43(1) (emphasis added). 
This mandates that all local ordinances be consistent with 
the provisions of the Utah Code. Therefore, a local government 
is without authority to pass any ordinance prohibited by, or in 
conflict with, state statutory laws. Salt Lake City v. Allred, 
20 Utah 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968). 
The Richfield ordinance is in direct conflict with state 
statute. Richfield ordinance 1983-2 1.2 does not provide for 
measurement of grams of alcohol in breath, as does state statute. 
See Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44(2). -It provides only for measurement 
of alcohol in the blood. 
The penalty for a first conviction under the Richfield 
ordinance differs significantly from the penalty for a same 
4 
conviction under state statute. Richfieldfs ordinance provides 
for a first conviction penalty of not less than sixty days nor 
more than six months. Richfield Ordinance 1983-2 1.3. For the 
same conviction under state statute, the penalty is not less than 
forty-eight nor more than 240 consecutive hours. Utah Code Ann. 
41-6-44(4). However, the state statute aandates that the minimum 
period of two days be imposed, while the Richfield ordinance 
allows for full suspension of the jail term. 
The state statute also enhances the penalty for a second or 
third conviction. The Richfield ordinance leaves such decisions 
within the discretion of the judge. 
The state statue addresses the concept that additional, or 
stronger, penalties are warranted, but the state also mandates a 
city's compliance so that a uniform treatment of ,fdriver under 
the influence11 will be achieved. In deviating from the state 
statute, the city of Richfield has decided to walk a different 
path, in violation of the enabling statute U.C.A. 41-6-43. 
Richfield's ordinance intrudes into an area preempted by 
comprehensive legislation by the Utah State Legislature. This 
comprehensive legislation was intended to blanket the area of 
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, as well as 
being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence. As such, the Richfield ordinance-must be held 
invalid. State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Utah Supreme Court's definition of "actual 
5 
physical control", the defendant was improperly convicted of 
such. That conviction was sustained under a city ordinance that 
is in direct conflict with Utah state law. Therefore, 
defendants conviction should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sheldc 
Attorney for Ap'pellant 
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